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Introduction
The internal dynamics of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) have been widely 
analyzed and criticized (Emerson/Noutcheva 2007, 
Duleba 2008, Böttger 2010). Instead of contributing 
to these debates, the paper mainly intends to 
address the role of the ‘common neighbourhood’ for 
the EU-Russia relations and to provide an insight 
into the Russian perspective. The term ‘common 
neighbourhood’ is used for Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova, since the study focuses on these three 
states only. Though the three countries of the 
Southern Caucasus are also included both in the 
ENP and in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative, 
their situation is not analyzed here.
The paper seeks to answer the following 
two research questions: (1) What were the Russian 
reactions to the development of the ENP and the 
EaP? (2) What are the main political tools Russia 
used in the common neighbourhood? Instead of 
exactly measuring their efficiency, this paper aims 
at providing an overview by using both officials’ and 
experts’ opinions as empirical sources.
In the Russian interpretation, the analysed 
region traditionally belongs to the Russian zone 
of influence, which is an opinion that is generally 
based on historical arguments. The paper argues 
that Russia has some definite security and defence 
interests in the common neighbourhood, which are 
mostly inherited from the Soviet times. Strategic 
considerations, especially the defence-related 
interests, are definitely playing a role in shaping 
Russia’s current attitude towards the region. As a 
result, Russia perceives the whole ENP from the 
very beginning as an EU effort to gain influence 
in the countries of the common neighbourhood, 
i.e. Russia’s traditional zone of influence. As an 
unsurprising reaction to the EU policies, Russia has 
been ready either to give positive offers to countries 
of the common neighbourhood, or to use restrictive 
measures.  
The main argument of this paper is that in 
the field of foreign, security and defence policy1 most 
of the Russian political offers towards the common 
neighbourhood have been weak and unattractive. 
They were mere reactions to Western initiatives, 
mainly aiming at preserving the political status quo.2
1  This analysis focuses almost exclusively on foreign, 
security and defense policy. Economic aspects, such as 
foreign trade, foreign direct investment, energy policy, etc. are 
addressed to the extent that is inevitable for understanding the 
political contexts. 
2  This reactive nature of the Russian ’neighbourhood 
policy’ is inofficially recognized by many Russian officials and 
The paper is composed of four main parts. The first 
chapter presents the Russian security interests in 
relation to the common neighbourhood. In the second 
chapter Russia’s perception of the development and 
functioning of the ENP is analyzed, based not only 
on official documents and academic papers, but on 
interviews conducted with Russian experts. In the 
following two chapters, two dimensions of Russian 
policies towards the common neighbourhood are 
studied. Thus, the third chapter deals with the political 
offers made, while the fourth chapter provides an 
overview of Russian capabilities of using restrictive 
political measures. The fifth and concluding chapter 
not only summarizes the previous parts but makes 
an effort to address the possible fields of political 
cooperation between the EU and Russia in the 
common neighbourhood. The recommendations 
given are aimed at decision-makers working either 
in EU institutions or in individual EU member states, 
dealing with foreign policy towards the common 
neighbourhood. 
experts.
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I Russian Security Interests in the Common 
Neighbourhood
In the field of security and defence, Russia clearly 
holds a much stronger position in the analyzed 
countries of the common neighbourhood than 
either the EU or the United States. This is partly a 
consequence of the historical heritage of the Soviet 
times and partly due to the developments, which 
have taken place since then.
First and foremost, in all three studied 
countries Russian troops are deployed, though in 
different frameworks. In Belarus and Ukraine their 
presence is legitimized by mutually agreed and still 
unchallenged international agreements, while in 
Moldova they could remain on the ground only due 
to the Russian intervention in the civil war in 1992. 
The ceasefire agreement forced on Moldova in 
summer 1992 prescribed the presence of Russian 
troops as peace-keepers. 
Military presence in the common 
neighbourhood is something that Russia does not 
intend to give up, even in the long run. Besides 
their geo-strategic value, Russian forces stationed 
in the neighbourhood are an important political tool 
for exercising direct influence over the politics of the 
neighbouring countries. Thus, it is not surprising that 
Moscow tries to preserve the presence of its forces 
in the ‘near abroad.’3
 
Belarus
Belarus is perceived as a country of primary 
importance for Russia in the field of defence. There 
are expert opinions according to which Minsk is 
the only remaining military ally of Moscow4 (Jasutis 
2007). The recently adopted Russian military doctrine 
mentions Belarus on the first rank when priorities 
of defence cooperation are discussed (Voennaya 
doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii 2010: 51). The 
importance of the joint use of military infrastructure 
with Belarus is explicitly mentioned. This also 
demonstrates that defence cooperation between two 
states is rapidly advancing, a development that has 
3  The expression originates from the Russian term 
ближнее зарубежье (blizhneye zarubezhye), and is referring 
to the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. 
The term „common neighbourhood” is not commonly used in 
Russia.
4  Interview with Dmitry Danilov, director of the 
Centre for European Security Studies at the Institute of Europe 
of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow, 13 November 
2009.
already been pointed out by some experts (Jasutis 
2007). The most important forums for this are the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
partially the Union State. Up to now, a fully integrated 
system of air defence has been established, which 
saw its first live test during the ‘Zapad 2009’ military 
exercise in September 2009 (Soyuzinfo.ru 2009). 
During the debate on the U.S. missile defence shield 
installations to be built in Central Europe, the real 
significance of this system became visible: Russia 
reacted by declaring its readiness to deploy modern 
S-400 air defence missiles and Iskander-M surface-
surface missiles in Belarus (Charter97.org 2008). 
Additionally, there are two Russian bases operating 
on Belarusian soil (Semionov 2006), and the defence 
industry cooperation between the two countries is 
also intensive.
All in all, Russia’s main aim in security policy 
related to Belarus is to deepen the defence integration 
of the two countries with all its consequences. Thus, 
it is not only ensuring the political and security loyalty 
of Minsk, but also possessing a strategic outpost 
and reliable ally in the region. Interestingly enough, 
despite the on-going gradual political opening up 
of Belarus towards the EU, no efforts are visible 
from the Belarusian side to extend this to security 
and defence policy to any extent. A pessimist 
interpretation of this ‘symptom’ might be that the 
Belarusian regime has de facto already lost its 
autonomy in issues of national security and defence.
Ukraine
The situation is much more complex regarding 
Ukraine, primarily because in times of the Soviet 
Union, Ukraine had a prioritized role in Soviet 
security and defence policy. There were numerous 
military bases, including those equipped with nuclear 
weapons. Significant parts of the Soviet defence 
industry complex were located on Ukrainian soil, 
which made the break-up a painful, complicated, 
and in many aspects, unfinished process. At the 
same time, Russia still considers Ukraine as a 
region of vital strategic importance. Consequently, 
the Kremlin did, does and will do everything possible 
to prevent Ukraine from joining the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) (Danilov 2009). Even 
the Ukrainian NATO approximation ambitions 
(especially in the reform of the armed forces) have 
generated harsh Russian criticism. One may recall 
the anti-NATO demonstrations in Crimea, several 
anti-NATO statements of various Russian politicians, 
and even the ill-fated anti-NATO referendum effort 
of the pro-Russian Ukrainian politician Viktor 
Medvedchuk in 2006 (Korduban 2007).
The presence of the Black Sea Fleet on 
Ukrainian soil is strongly connected to this problem. 
The pre-2010 Ukrainian governments perceived 
the presence of the Russian fleet as an imminent 
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security concern not only because of the warships 
themselves, but also due to the large number of 
Russian navy and security personnel stationed on 
the bases. Following the ’Orange Revolution’ and 
the Ukrainian leadership choosing a more pro-
Western and pro-NATO course, the presence of the 
Black Sea Fleet was considered as being a blocking 
element on Ukraine’s way towards NATO. Thus, the 
planned complete withdrawal of the fleet by 2017 
was long awaited by pro-Western political forces 
(BBC 2005).
Besides the Fleet’s very presence, there 
were also several smaller scale insults and conflicts 
after 2004, but the situation significantly worsened 
during the war in Georgia. The Black Sea Fleet 
actively participated in the war: after defeating the 
Georgian navy, it blockaded the country during 
the conflict. However, Ukraine actively supported 
Georgia, both politically and by training, the 
shipment of military equipment, etc.5 This resulted 
in an obvious conflict of interests between Moscow 
and Kyiv. Besides condemning the Russian 
‘aggression’ several times, President Yushchenko 
ordered to restrain the movements of Russian navy 
on Ukrainian waters. Ethnic tensions in the Republic 
got strengthened, especially after the return of the 
victorious Russian warships to Crimean ports (RFE/
RL 2008). Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia as independent countries induced 
further fears that Crimea could be the next case. 
The protection of Russian citizens could have easily 
been the pretext, while the fleet could have provided 
the necessary political and military backing. 
However, the fleet-issue seems to be solved 
with the so-called Kharkiv agreement, signed by 
the new Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in April 2010. 
According to the deal, the presence of the Black 
Sea Fleet on Ukrainian soil will be extended by 
25 years, until 2042 (Hedenskog 2010). This does 
not only mean a de facto hindrance of Ukraine’s 
NATO membership in the near future, but also the 
enabling of Russia to maintain its military presence 
in Ukraine. Consequently, the status of Crimea will 
remain unsettled and will continue to be a source of 
further tensions in the relationship between Russia 
and Ukraine, being easily exploited by the former 
(Hedenskog 2010).
In addition to the fleet presence, Russia has 
maintained two additional bases in Ukraine, namely 
two early warning radar facilities, one in Mukachevo 
and the other one in Sevastopol. Moscow has already 
5  Ukraine supplied the Georgian army with T-72 
tanks, including the modified T-72 SIM-1s. In: „Georgia 
Army.” Globalsecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/georgia/army.htm , accessed 10 Nov 2010.
announced in 2007 that these bases in Ukraine will 
be closed (RIA Novosti 2010) and similar facilities 
built on Russian soil, more exactly in Armavir, will 
take over their duties (WMD Insights, 2007 - 2008).
A third element of Russia’s security and 
defence-related interests towards Ukraine is 
connected to the defence industry. It is a direct 
heritage of the Soviet period that numerous 
interconnections exist between the Russian and 
Ukrainian defence industry (Szabó 2009: 57). 
Moreover, Ukraine has enjoyed a monopolistic 
position in the production of weapons and parts of 
weapons until recently: helicopter and ship engines 
produced by the Motor Sich company in Zaporozhe, 
as well as air-to-air missiles, sensors, etc. Russia is 
striving to get rid of these outside dependencies, but 
this is supposed to take time. For example, though 
combat helicopter-engine building capabilities have 
been established in Russia, production numbers are 
still not sufficient. Thus Moscow still needs to rely 
on Kyiv. Besides, in other fields of industry, such 
as in the space rocket production, certain critical 
elements of the production line are still available only 
in Ukraine (Szabó 2009: 59).
However, despite these still existing 
interconnections between Russia and Ukraine, 
defence policy coordination has been very weak 
between the two countries, especially since the 
‘Orange Revolution’. Ukraine did not join the CIS 
formally, not to mention the Collective Security 
Treaty or later the CSTO, instead it chose GUAM6, 
and started to develop its relations with NATO. All 
these steps were well in line with the ‘multi-vectorial’ 
foreign policy pursued under former President Leonid 
Kuchma (Poti 2001). Moreover, since the ‘Orange 
Revolution’ there also have been concrete cases of 
tensions between the two armed forces: the most 
visible ones were connected to the Black Sea Fleet 
stationed in Crimea. Besides, before the August 
2008 war Ukraine has been accused by Russia 
several times of supplying Georgia with weapons, 
an information that is confirmed by the public arms 
trade data of the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute.7
In the long run and in line with the diverging 
foreign and security policy objectives of Moscow and 
Kyiv, one can well count on decreasing defence-
related interconnections between both countries 
(Szabó 2009: 70). Nevertheless, Russian military 
presence will supposedly be maintained in Ukraine, 
6  GUAM is a regional organization, composed of 
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. The first letters of 
the country names give the acronym GUAM.
7  The Arms Transfers Database of the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute is accessible at 
armstrade.sipri.org.
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6
whether in one form or the other, its main purpose 
‘only’ being to keep Ukraine away from factually 
joining NATO. 
Moldova
The security and defence aspect of the Russian-
Moldovan relations is relatively simple. First and 
foremost, Moscow’s main interest is to preserve its 
political and military influence in the region, which 
includes preventing Moldova from joining NATO. 
The primary tool of this is the presence of Russian 
troops in Transnistria. Initially, in 1999, Russia 
committed itself to withdraw these troops until 2002, 
this deadline being extended to 2003 later on. 
Finally Moscow started to claim that the remaining 
troops have been stationed there according to 
Russian-Transnistrian bilateral agreements, thus 
claiming that the Istanbul commitments did not 
apply to them. In summer 2008, Russia made a 
settlement offer: Moscow would have been ready 
to allow Moldova’s re-unification and pull out its 
troops from Transnistria in exchange for Moldova 
giving up pro-NATO intentions and stepping out of 
GUAM (RFE/RL 2008). The Moldovan side rejected 
the proposal due to its political conditions which 
were unacceptable for the Moldovan government. 
Until recently Russia was basically satisfied with 
the status quo in the Moldova-Transnistria conflict. 
All the solutions proposed by Moscow included 
some key elements from the current situation, which 
made it very favourable for Moscow: legitimating the 
presence of Russian troops on Moldovan soil and 
thus ensuring Moldova’s neutrality, guarantee of 
a de facto veto right for Transnistria in the unified 
state (regardless of the structure of the future state), 
recognition of the privatization that took place in 
Transnistria, etc. Characterizing the Russian attitude 
to the Transnistrian conflict more generally, Russia 
has rather been interested in prolonging the conflict 
than in solving it (Popescu 2005: 17). Though, taking 
the most recent negotiations of German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel and President Dmitry Medvedev into 
account, this attitude seems to change.  
However, one has to note that besides 
the troops, gargantuan amounts of ex-Soviet 
ammunition are still located in Transnistria. Although, 
approximately 12.000 tons of the original 40.000 
tons (!) have already been taken back to Russia 
in the early 2000s, the removal of the rest cannot 
only be a question of political will, but a technically 
complicated, dangerous and expensive task, due to 
the bad physical condition of the ammunition stored 
there. 
As another tool of preserving influence, 
Russia has been constantly pressing Moldova in 
order to prevent closer relations with NATO. The 
efforts to make Moldova sign the Collective Security 
Treaty, and later to make it join the CSTO, were 
aimed at this objective, though Moldova refused to 
comply. 
The interesting element in this context is the 
constitutional neutrality of Moldova. The latter and a 
ban of any foreign troops on the territory of Moldova 
have been prescribed in the 1994 constitution. 
Russia tends to refer to the neutrality of Moldova 
when it pushes against any kind of closer cooperation 
with NATO. However, as expert Ion Marandici points 
out, the Russian military presence in Transnistria 
at the same time “shows a clear disregard of and 
represents an infringement on Moldova’s permanent 
neutrality” (Marandici 2007: 2). The debates on 
neutrality did not prevent Moldova from deepening 
cooperation with NATO in the framework of the 
Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2006 (Marandici 
2007: 3). Nevertheless, the Russian efforts seem 
to have achieved an important success when the 
then Communist-dominated government adopted 
the new National Security Strategy of Moldova in 
2008, keeping the provision of permanent neutrality 
(moldova.org 2008: 6). The main question in this 
regard is how the new Moldovan government is 
going to perceive the foreign and security policy 
priorities set by its predecessor, and whether the 
constitution and the national security strategy remain 
unchanged.
An interesting and recent case was the 
option of deploying Russian missiles to the region 
of Transnistria, as an ‘answer’ to the U.S. plans to 
establish a missile defence base in Romania. This 
idea was voiced by the separatist leader Igor Smirnov 
in February 2010. However, the Kremlin quickly 
turned down this invitation by declaring that such 
a move “could trigger a serious regional conflict”, 
thus being against Moscow’s interests. This can be 
seen as a signal of Moscow intending to discuss the 
missile defence issue primarily with Washington, 
and not with smaller states (EurActiv.com 2010). 
Such a move also showed the limited importance 
of Moldova in the eyes of the Russian leadership in 
comparison to issues of global importance like the 
U.S.–Russia relations.
This chapter has shown that Russia has 
certain security and defence-related interests in 
countries of the common neighbourhood. The 
question to what extent these interests shape 
Russia’s perceptions of EU policies in the common 
neighbourhood will be in the focus of the following 
chapter.
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II The European Neighbourhood Policy 
towards the Common Neighbourhood - from 
a Russian Perspective
Russia has traditionally perceived Eastern Europe 
as its special sphere of interests, and this has 
particularly been true regarding the countries of the 
former Soviet Union. Thus it is not surprising, that 
the eastern enlargement of the EU was high on the 
agenda of Russian political debates way before 
it actually took place in 2004 (Baranovsky 2002: 
125-128, 132-141). Especially the NATO and EU 
accessions of the Baltic States were perceived as 
an interference of the ‘traditional’ Russian sphere of 
influence.
Russia’s perceptions of the ENP
As the eastern enlargement started to become reality 
in the early 2000s, the problems of Eastern Europe 
suddenly started to ‘come closer’ to the European 
Union. The birth of the ENP was in many aspects an 
answer to this challenge. The original “Wider Europe” 
proposal envisaged to involve Russia and offered it 
to have a stake in the EU’s internal market (European 
Commission 2003). However, Russia was left out 
from the ENP, launched in 2004. According to both 
Russian and EU opinions, the exclusion took place 
mostly because Moscow rejected the idea of being 
put into the same category with small neighbours 
like Moldova. At the same time it demanded to be 
treated as a strategic partner of the EU (Selivanova 
2008: 101).
Besides the prestige elements, Russia’s 
motivations to stay out from the ENP could well 
be connected to the fact that Moscow was not 
consulted on the 2004 enlargement to a sufficient 
degree, although similar demands were voiced 
in line with negotiations to the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) (Danilov 2009). The 
‘Wider Europe’ proposal already brought Russian 
officials to claim that the PCA should be modified 
as a reaction to the EU enlargement and due to the 
intended strategic change (Grushko 2004: 22). 
According to many Russian political and 
academic views, Poland intended to dominate 
the Eastern policy of the EU following the 2004 
enlargement, pretending to be the outpost of 
the West in the East (Shishelina 2006: 54). The 
establishment of the Community of Democratic 
Choice “for the democratic states, which do not want 
to belong to the Russian zone of influence” was a 
demonstrative example (Bukharin 2006: 122). As 
Bukharin further argues, the Polish foreign policy 
was clearly directed against Russia, and indirectly 
against its strategic interests in the common 
neighbourhood, especially between 2005 and 
2007. In the ‘Solidary Country’ (Solidarne Państwo) 
programme of the Marcinkiewicz-government, 
the NATO membership of Ukraine was planned to 
take place in 2008. Furthermore, Poland actively 
supported the Belarusian opposition (Bukharin 2006: 
123). Shishelina recognizes that besides irritating 
Russia, the Polish attitude was also a problem for 
the EU as a whole. It complicated the EU’s attempts 
to improve relations with Russia (Shishelina 2006: 
54-55), particularly with the veto during the start of 
negotiations on the new PCA. 
Since its launch, the ENP has clearly been 
perceived in Russia as an EU-effort to extend its 
zone of influence in the post-Soviet region, and 
as the intention to decrease the power of Moscow 
(Selivanova 2008: 102). While the EU is pushing its 
foreign partners towards the adoption of European 
standards, legal approximation and regulatory 
harmonization, Russia in fact aims at increasing 
its influence over the given partner countries 
(Karaganov/Jurgens 2009: 72-80). 
Unlike the EU, seemingly in favour of a more 
comprehensive and multilateral approach, Russia 
prefers to address the countries of the common 
neighbourhood bilaterally. This logic of action is 
identical to Russia’s approach towards the EU in 
different policy fields: bilateral intergovernmental 
relations are preferred to negotiations with the EU 
as a whole. Russian experts openly admit and 
justify this behaviour claiming that Moscow has had 
many negative experiences with cooperating with 
the EU in the past, primarily with regard to Russia’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Siberian overflights and the delayed start of the 
negotiations for the new PCA (Karaganov/Jurgens 
2009: 109f.). At the same time, most successes in 
political and strategic dialogues were achieved on 
bilateral bases, primarily with Germany, France, Italy 
and Spain. The preference for the bilateral track also 
accounts for external trade and investment contacts. 
However, Russia’s bilateral approach in the common 
neighbourhood meets with criticism: In a joint 
publication of the National Investment Council and 
the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences, the authors argue for the need of a 
comprehensive ‘Russian neighbourhood policy’ 
towards the countries of the former Soviet Union 
(Evropeyskaya politika sosedstva 2008: 127-129). 
The proposal suggests that all activities conducted 
in the common neighbourhood should be included 
in the negotiations on the new PCA. Besides, it 
advises that many aspects of the ENP should simply 
be copied and adopted to Russian standards and 
capabilities. Foreign trade and economic contacts 
are mentioned as elements of primary importance, 
which should be used in a highly preferential 
way in order to have a demonstrative effect as 
well. Moreover, given the EU’s slowly developing 
relations with these states , the paper envisages 
the strengthening of various Russian-led regional 
integrations, especially the Customs Union with 
Belarus and Kazakhstan. Russia should bond the 
neighbouring ‘states of European orientation’ to 
itself, by realizing the political-military integration 
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in the frameworks of the CSTO, the Eurasian 
Economic Community and the Union State. Russia 
should also strive for membership, or for observer 
status as a minimum, in all organization operating on 
the territory of the common neighbourhood, just as 
the U.S. does in the GUAM. 
Though at first glance the proposal appears 
to be rather aggressive, it also contains suggestions 
on the cooperation between the EU and Russia. It 
prescribes the launch of large-scale projects between 
the EU and the CIS and between the EU and the 
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) in the 
field of transcontinental infrastructures, East-West 
transport and traffic, etc. It also suggests that the 
PCA negotiations should deal with the creation of the 
legal-institutional framework of energy cooperation, 
because this would be of joint interest for the EU and 
Russia. So far no public reactions were made on this 
proposal.
Russia’s reactions to the Eastern Partnership
Both the general analysis of Russia’s sensitivities 
regarding the common neighbourhood and the 
more specific evaluation of the Russian attitude 
towards the EaP require a close consideration of the 
circumstances under which the EaP was born.
The original Polish-Swedish proposal 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Poland, 2008) contained certain elements, which 
were perceived in Russia as hostile; especially both 
the support of the territorial integrity offered to the 
Eastern neighbours, and the committed promotion of 
democratic values were alarming signs for Russia. 
Moreover, following the August 2008 war in Georgia, 
the EU has openly declared that it was going to 
intensify the relations with the Eastern neighbours. 
It was stated that there was a connection between 
the EaP proposal and Russia’s role in the Caucasus 
crisis, which made the initiative appear to be directed 
against Russia (Stewart 2009: 1). The EU seemed 
to stir Russia’s apprehension: while discussing the 
EaP in autumn-winter 2008, the EU also granted a 
number of benefits to Ukraine, suspended the visa 
ban against numerous Belarusian leaders including 
Lukashenko, and started negotiations with Moldova 
on a possible accession to the Energy Community 
Treaty.
According to the mentioned documents, 
this impression on the anti-Russian nature of the 
EaP project was further strengthened by the fact 
that Russia could eventually play a secondary, ‘third 
party’ role in the partnership only. At the same time, 
some Russian experts – though vaguely – demanded 
the role of a ‘controller’ or ‘observer’ to be given 
to Moscow (Borko 2009). In other words, Russia 
criticised the EU because it made another step 
towards the common neighbourhood, without at least 
asking the opinion of Moscow. All in all, the Russian 
reactions were rather harsh; they accused the EU of 
creating its own zone of influence, and of forcing the 
neighbouring countries to make a choice between 
the EU and Russia (Stewart 2009: 2). Similarly to the 
ENP, the EaP has also been perceived by experts as 
a type of “soft power” influence (Borko 2009).
The 23 March 2009 agreement between 
the EU and Ukraine on the European participation 
in the reconstruction of the gas transit infrastructure 
induced huge outcries in Moscow: Putin summoned 
a special press conference for condemning the deal, 
Medvedev cancelled the next round of consultations 
with Ukraine, and many official declarations warned 
the EU of trying to take control over the Ukrainian 
energy infrastructure, otherwise Russia could stop 
buying EU-made equipments for its energy sector 
(Górska 2009: 2-4). This seemed to be the first time 
that Russia perceived the EU’s actions as a really 
serious blow on its energy positions in the post-
Soviet region.
One has to admit that Russian concerns 
and demands have partially been taken into 
account during the elaboration of the EaP, and 
the final text differs from the previous version in a 
number of ways. The most significant modification 
was already mentioned; namely, the reference to 
the “consolidation of their [i.e. the partners, A.R] 
statehood and territorial integrity” was withdrawn.8 
The change happened mostly in order not to cause 
diplomatic irritation in the Georgian post-war context 
and thus to ease the tensions with Moscow.
When the EaP was finally launched on 7 May 
2009, the Russian minister of foreign affairs Sergei 
Lavrov commented that he was hoping the EU did 
not intend to make the neighbours choose between 
Russia and the EU (Lavrov 2009b). Nevertheless and 
generally speaking, Moscow has been fully aware 
of the limited importance and capacity of the EaP 
initiative, especially regarding its financial dimension 
(Chizhov 2009). Although the initiative itself is not 
perceived as something which would endanger the 
Russian influence in the region (Strelkov 2009: 11), 
both Russian and Western authors seem to agree 
that Moscow needs to pay particular attention to its 
energy-related dimension (ibid., Meister/May 2009: 
2).
Concerning Belarus, a problematic country 
for the EaP (Meister/May 2009: 2), Moscow 
is concerned about the improving EU-Belarus 
relations. However, this is rather connected to the 
rapprochement in general and not to the EaP in 
particular. As Lavrov stated on 25 November 2009, 
Russia is not opposed to the Belarusian participation 
in certain EaP projects, because this is not seen as 
8  One of the main advocates of the modifications 
– mainly aimed at easing the tensions with Moscow – was 
Germany (Végh 2009: 2).
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a rival to the active participation of Belarus in the 
integration processes in the CIS area, including the 
EurAsEC and the Customs Union (Lavrov 2009a). 
Regarding an eventual Russian participation 
in the framework of EaP, the final version of the 
EaP document leaves the door open for third party 
participation in certain projects. Russia´s originally 
harsh reaction to this possibility seems to be 
softened. In November 2009, Lavrov did not rule out 
that Russia could join certain EaP projects (Lavrov 
2009b). Nevertheless, Russia’s behaviour remains 
dominantly passive (Danilov 2009).9 No initiatives 
have been proposed by Moscow as it seems to wait 
for any concrete EU proposal.
The thematic platforms and flagship 
initiatives raise more serious concerns in Russia 
than the general EaP initiative does. The proposal 
of providing border management assistance for 
the eastern partners means for Moscow that the 
EU would assist the strengthening of the – to date 
practically non-existent – Ukraine-Russia, Belarus-
Russia and Azerbaijan-Russia borders. Thus it 
might be interpreted as an effort to isolate Russia 
via separating it from its neighbours (Danilov 2009).
The harsh Russian reactions to the 23 March 
2009 EU-Ukraine agreement on the reconstruction 
of the energy infrastructures demonstrate 
Russia’s sensitivity: if the EU supports the Eastern 
neighbours in the reconstruction of their energy 
transit infrastructure, as the EaP also prescribes 
for the countries of the common neighbourhood, it 
hampers Russian efforts to take them over in order 
to ensure an uninterrupted westward flow of oil and 
gas, and to decrease the freedom of movement 
of the transit countries. From a strictly theoretical 
perspective of energy security, the security of 
transit gets improved anyways, as technological, 
infrastructural developments take place. However, 
the type of improvement requested by Russia and 
the EU differ completely.
Another reason for Russia’s resentment 
towards the EaP relates to its approach concerning 
the phenomenon of weak statehood in the countries 
of the common neighbourhood. Russia has a set 
of leverages (Hedenskog/Larsson 2007), such 
as, inter alia, economic pressure, corruption, and 
energy supplies. These are used with the aim to 
hamper the functioning of state administrations in 
the common neighbourhood, exercised especially 
in Ukraine. However, the comprehensive institution-
development plans in the EaP, based on the 
financial support of the European Investment Bank, 
seek to make the state administrations of the partner 
9  Interview with Susan Stewart, Research Fellow of 
the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 
Berlin, 11 January 2010. 
countries more efficient and more transparent. 
Russia fears that the more the performance of the 
national administrations will improve, the more its 
potential to interfere and exercise informal pressure 
on the respective governments will decrease. 
Another element of Russian concerns about 
both the ENP in general and the EaP in particular 
is their nature of “soft power” (Danilov 2009). When 
Western actors, including the EU, refer to the 
promotion of democratic values and the support of 
civil society, this is often connected in Russia with the 
so-called “coloured revolutions”, which took place in 
several countries of the common neighbourhood. 
Thus support given to the local civil societies is often 
interpreted as Western efforts of ‘destabilization’. 
The fact that the main beneficiaries of the EaP will 
be the state level public administrations, while only 
limited sums will be spent on the support of the civil 
societies (European Commission 2009: 4) does 
hardly change this general perception. 
An additional, though less visible, element 
of growing importance is that Russia recognized the 
importance of ‘soft power’, and has started using its 
own resources. It already has a remarkable potential, 
for example through the Russian-speaking media 
and the visa-free travel in the CIS area (Popescu/
Wilson 2009: 27-39). Besides, there are a lot more 
possible reserves to be used, for example in the field 
of investment, science, education, culture, and via 
a further strengthening of the role of the Russian 
language in the CIS (Solovyov 2009). Some of the 
competent organizational structures are already 
set up and function, for example the Russkiy Mir 
Foundation, the Rossotrudnichestvo government 
agency, the Institute for Russians Abroad and some 
others (Lerhis/Kudors/Indāns: 2007). However, 
currently the activities are mostly limited on Russian 
ethnic minorities in the neighbouring countries. An 
‘opening up’ to the wider public is taking place only 
with moderate pace – one could name, for example, 
the rapidly growing number of centres financed by the 
‘Russkiy Mir’ not only in the CIS, but also in many EU 
countries. However, informal sources in the Russian 
expert community say that the coordination between 
various actors and agencies could be enhanced. As 
Russia is on the way to start a more active use of 
its ‘soft power’ capabilities, it obviously perceives 
similar activities of the EU as rivalling. 
S
P
E
S
 P
ol
ic
y 
P
ap
er
s 
20
10
10
III Political Offers and Initiatives Towards 
the Common Neighbourhood
Similar to the EU, Russia operates a number of 
political tools in order to pursue its own interests 
in the countries of the common neighbourhood. 
One may call these moves either influence building 
(Popescu/Wilson 2009: 17) or legitimate realization 
of interests (Danilov 2009). Benefits and sanctions 
are used by both sides in their relations with the 
common neighbourhood. While the EU approach 
has been widely analyzed – and often criticized – 
by a number of experts, (for example Duleba 2008, 
Chilosi 2006), relevant Russian initiatives and 
policies towards the common neighbourhood seem 
to receive less attention in the West.
As an introduction, one has to see that both 
the original ENP and the EaP initiative use a clear 
wording: they do not imply any kind of accession 
perspective for the targeted countries, thus these 
policies must not be perceived as gateways to EU 
membership. The lack of membership perspective is 
regularly criticized by both West- and East-European 
experts, who argue that the EU deliberately deprives 
itself of its most effective foreign policy tool and 
motivation method (Duleba 2008). Regarding the 
political perspectives offered to the neighbours, 
EU policies are still conducted in line with Romano 
Prodi’s famous sentence: neighbours may “share 
everything with the Union, but institutions” (Prodi 
2002). However, as the Italian analyst Chilosi argued, 
even this promise was not likely to be fulfilled, simply 
because the EU has been unable to give the same 
economic advantages to the neighbours as it gives 
to its poorest members (Chilosi 2006: 3). With other 
words, even the promised “everything” has not been 
realized. Russia is aware of this structural weakness 
of the EU neighbourhood policy and tries to exploit it 
via offering alternative proposals. 
Concerning positive political offers, Russia 
has a number of parallel proposals on the table. In 
addition to the present efforts to provide integration 
alternatives, there already have been two of such 
Russian initiatives in the past, which seriously 
changed the political landscape of the studied 
region. The first was the plan of the Russia-Belarus 
Union State, and the second was the Kozak-
memorandum, a settlement proposal made in the 
Moldova-Transnistria conflict. 
 
Efforts of Inducing Constitutional Changes 
The Russia-Belarus Union State project goes 
back to the clearly pro-Russian course pursued by 
the Belarusian foreign policy in the late 1990s to 
the early 2000s. As Wilson and Rontoyanni argue 
(2004: 44), the motivation of Lukashenko was mainly 
to strengthen the social and economic stability of 
Belarus via getting into closer cooperation with 
Russia. Following a few preliminary agreements, 
the Treaty on the creation of a Union State with 
Russia and Belarus was signed in late 1999, with 
the ratification process finished 26 January 2000. 
However, despite the official Belarusian 
enthusiasm about the Union State, the cooperation 
intention from the side of Minsk was limited to 
extract as many economic benefits and subsidies 
from Moscow as possible. As Belarus is a key transit 
country for the Russian energy shipments to Europe, 
Moscow had hardly any other choice than tolerating 
this behaviour. Though moderate Russian moves 
were already made in these times in order to take 
control over key Belarusian energy infrastructure, 
Minsk managed to resist the pressure via constantly 
delaying the privatization of the Beltransgaz 
company, the Mozhyr oil refinery, etc. The situation 
changed in August 2002, when Putin made 
Lukashenko choose between full-fledged integration 
to Russia, or a gradual integration based on the EU 
‘harmonization’ model (Wilson/Rontoyanni 2004: 
49). The first choice was obviously unacceptable for 
the Belarusian president, as he did not want to give 
up his position as president of a sovereign country. 
As Piontkovsky argues, Putin did not want Belarus 
to really become part of Russia, he only intended 
to end the demagogy around the Union State, and 
put the relationship on a more pragmatic basis (The 
Russian Journal 2002).
Since then, the Union State project has 
hardly made any real progress. Though a number of 
union institutions are set up – the Union State has its 
own budget, focusing mostly on issues of economy, 
trade, infrastructure, and in a growing extent 
security and defence – both the fundaments and the 
final political objective of the organization are still 
undefined. Ever since the above-mentioned proposal 
by Putin, Belarus has been lacking rhetorical and 
active enthusiasm in further integration with Russia. 
According to Sergey Kastsyan, deputy chairman of 
the foreign affairs committee of the lower house of 
the Belarusian parliament, the two sides understand 
the integration in a different way (RFE/RL’s Belarus 
Service. Newsline 2008). 
On the other hand, one may observe 
Moscow increasing the pressure on Belarus in 
certain policy fields, mainly in defence, energy, 
economy and foreign policy. The Union State project 
is one of many frameworks in which Russia intends 
to increase its influence over Belarus. Put differently, 
it has been degraded from a political objective to a 
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political tool.
The story of the Kozak-memorandum 
also reveals Russia’s efforts to induce institutional 
change. In late 2003, Russia proposed a settlement 
plan for the Transnistrian conflict to the Moldovan 
government. The latter prescribed the federalist re-
unification of Moldova in a way which would have 
empowered Transnistria to have a veto right over all 
important decisions of the whole state (Löwenhardt 
2004: 6). The reject of the Kozak-memorandum 
by the Moldovan president resulted in a lasting 
cool-down of the Russian-Moldovan relations. If 
the memorandum had been successfully realized, 
it would not only have changed the constitutional 
system of Moldova, but would have also conserved 
the legitimate presence of Russian troops in the 
country for another two decades.
Providing integration alternatives
Though the fundamental re-shaping of the political 
landscape in Eastern-Europe seems to be currently 
off the Russian political agenda, Moscow keeps 
pursuing its own interests via “presenting itself as an 
alternative” to a Western integration (Popescu/Wilson 
2009: 29). Moscow encourages the neighbouring 
countries to favour the international organizations 
dominated by Russia, instead of longing for either 
EU or NATO accession. They should either join these 
organizations, if they are not members yet (such as 
Ukraine in the CIS, or Belarus to the new Customs 
Union), or be more active members (Moldova in the 
CIS, or Belarus in the CSTO) (Danilov 2009).
The particularity of the Russian-dominated 
network of international organizations is their much 
more limited focus of issues than the EU’s, pursuing 
the overall goal of a constantly deepening integration 
in the common neighbourhood. Though the author 
does not aspire to provide a full list of functions, a 
short overview on competencies and members of 
the Russian-dominated organizations might still be 
useful:
Organization Established Full members Main functions
Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS)
1991 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan (+ Ukraine as 
participating non-member)
Political coordination
Economic cooperation
Loose security and defence 
cooperation
Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO)
2002 Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan
Security and defence 
cooperation, mutual defence 
guarantee, defence industry 
cooperation
Union State of Russia and 
Belarus
1999 Russia, Belarus Political coordination (limited 
functioning)
Security and defence 
cooperation
Economic cooperation, joint 
investment and development 
projects
Cultural links 
Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC)
2006 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
Economic cooperation
Common Economic Space 
/ Customs Union of the 
EurAsEc
2010 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia Intensified economic 
cooperation, customs union
Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO)
2001 China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan
Cooperation on security, 
defence, mainly against 
terrorism and separatism
Economic cooperation, 
energy
Cultural cooperation, 
research, education
Table 1: Overview on competencies and members of the Russian-dominated organizations.
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The overlapping memberships in the various 
Russian-led integration structures apply mostly 
to the Central-Asian republics as well as Belarus, 
while Ukraine and Moldova are participating only in 
the CIS. Georgia has stepped out even of this latter 
organization in 2009. Membership and participation 
in Russian-led integration structures can be used 
as indicators of how close the relationship between 
a given state and Russia is. Of the three Western 
neighbourhood countries studied, only Belarus has 
been favouring membership in almost all Russian-
initiated integration structures, while Ukraine and 
Moldova have been much more reluctant in this 
regard.
Some of the (Russian-led) organizations 
are often perceived as mirror-images of Western 
integration, such as the CSTO as an equivalent of 
NATO, or EurAsEC as an answer to the European 
Economic Area (Popescu/Wilson 2009: 30). Though 
there is an element of truth in this comparison, the 
picture is (slightly) more complicated, concerning 
both the economic and the security dimension. 
Preserving the economic ties originating from the 
former Soviet Union was enough of an essential 
motivation behind establishing the CIS in 1991. 
The plan to create a Single Economic Space with 
the membership of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan was regarded as a natural step forward, 
being finalized in 2003. But the victory of the ` Orange 
Revolution´ in Ukraine put the proposal to a halt, as 
the new Ukrainian leadership started to pursue a 
pro-European course instead. 
Membership in the Russian-led organizations 
offer easy-to-get economic benefits, such as free 
trade, a customs union, subsidized energy prices, 
etc. Besides, they also serve as tools of exercising 
pressure in a way that they either prevent, or 
hamper joining Western organizations. The already 
mentioned Single Economic Space project had an 
“express purpose” to keep Ukraine away from the 
EU and NATO (Trenin 2007: 200). One of the most 
recent examples is the WTO. With the signing of the 
Customs Union agreement in the framework of the 
Common Economic Space of the EurAsEC in 2009, 
Moscow effectively prevented both Kazakhstan and 
Belarus from joining the WTO, if Russian membership 
in the latter organization would be blocked. As 
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin put it in June 
2009, when the establishment of the Customs Union 
was already in its final phase: “Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan intend to join the WTO as a single 
customs union, not individually” (RIA Novosti 2009). 
Another Russian-led sub-regional organization, the 
CSTO also has such a political preventive function.10
10  This issue will be addressed in more detail in the 
next chapter under the aspect of political restricitive measures.  
A typical element of this strategy aiming at 
‘providing an alternative’ is that Russia successfully 
presents these regional organizations as respected 
players of the international arena. For example, 
CSTO has achieved observer status in the UN 
General Assembly, CIS regularly sends election 
observers to all elections which take place in the 
post-Soviet region. Besides, CSTO was recognized 
both by the OSCE and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO). There are also plans to start 
cooperation with NATO, especially in Afghanistan. 
President Medvedev’s new European 
Security Treaty proposal contains similar elements, 
as it mentions both the CSTO and the CIS as 
possible participants of the new agreement next to 
EU, OSCE and NATO (President of Russia 2009). 
To sum up, the intents to present these Russian-
dominated organizations as legitimate and equal to 
the Western ones are clearly visible.
However, the Russian approach of 
providing integration alternatives also has its own 
weaknesses. Namely, the targeted countries, 
i.e. countries of the common neighbourhood and 
Central-Asian countries, show a tendency of using 
these organizations as forums for bargaining with 
Russia over receiving newer and greater economic 
and political benefits.11 If the Russian offer is not 
attractive enough, they might easily turn towards 
the EU (like Ukraine and Belarus do), the U.S. or 
China (like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan do) in order 
to either convince Russia to grant the requested 
benefits, or receive it from the other ‘great powers’ 
interested in the region. Although these weaknesses 
are recognized by the Kremlin (Danilov 2009), to 
date there seems to be no successful Russian effort 
to counteract them. As shown above, its offer and 
proposals remain mostly unattractive.
11  Meister: Interview with Dr. Stefan Meister, Research 
Fellow of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 23 
February 2010, Berlin.
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IV Restrictive Political Measures Used in the 
Common Neighbourhood
Apart from the political offers and initiatives discussed 
in the previous chapter, Moscow also has a rich 
inventory of various restrictive measures, aiming 
at influencing, pressurizing and sometimes openly 
forcing governments of the neighbouring countries 
to comply with the Russian will. Three main types of 
these restrictive political measures, which have the 
greatest influence on the three countries studied, 
will be discussed. The analyzed measures are (1) 
support for separatism, (2) trade embargoes, and (3) 
immigration restrictions.
 
Supporting Separatism 
Both Moldova and Ukraine face threats of territorial 
separatism. In Moldova, the existence of the de 
facto independent ‘Republic of Transnistria’ depends 
mostly and almost exclusively on Russia. Even 
during the civil war of 1992, separatists could resist 
Moldova only with the support of the 14th Russian 
Army stationed there (King 2000: 194). The ceasefire 
agreement, signed on 27th July 1992, that ended the 
armed phase of the conflict, was also negotiated 
under Russian influence and already recognized 
Transnistria as an independent actor (in the three-
sided Joint Control Commission both Transnistria 
and Russia were given one of the seats). Transnistria 
is also included in the five-sided negotiation format, 
composed of Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Transnistria 
and the OSCE. As decision-making in both bodies 
has been based on consensus, this allows the 
separatists to block every settlement initiative they 
want and to pursue the prolongation of the conflict. 
Besides, as already explained, Russia maintained 
the presence of its peacekeeping forces in the 
region, thus preventing Moldova from re-unifying its 
territory.
However, the most important element 
of Russian support given to Transnistria is the 
economic one. First and foremost, Transnistria has 
paid almost nothing for the gas used in the last 20 
years. This cheap (i.e. practically free) energy has 
therefore kept the economy and industry of the 
separatist republic running. Up to now, the gas debt 
of Transnistria accounts to over 1,7 billion dollars 
(AZI.MD 2008:12:18). Moreover, Gazprom counts 
the debt accumulated by Transnistria to the gas debt 
of Moldova, which means that Chisinau will also have 
to pay for the consumption of the separatist region. 
Moreover, Moscow regularly provides Transnistria 
with ‘humanitarian aid’, which allows the separatist 
regime to increase pensions, run the school system, 
etc. For example, in 2007-2008 Transnistria received 
30 million USD from Russia to overcome the drought 
consequences. A year later, another 14 million was 
transferred in order to help Transnistria to cope with 
the global financial crisis (Moldova.org 2009).
Concerning Ukraine, the Russian support of 
separatist forces is of a more complex nature. The 
region of primary importance is Crimea. As a territory 
it was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic only in 1954 and since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union the status of the territory has constantly 
been on the Russian-Ukrainian agenda, despite the 
autonomy that the Republic of Crimea enjoys inside 
Ukraine. It has its own parliament and political parties, 
though the judicial system of Ukraine is applied here. 
This and the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationed 
here, provides a fertile ground for separatism. Since 
the break-up of the Soviet Union, Moscow has kept 
supporting various Russian nationalist forces in 
the Crimea in order to put pressure on the central 
government in Kyiv. In 2006, a coalition of the 
Party of Regions of current president Yanukovich 
won almost 70% of the seats in the Crimean 
Parliament. Another member of the coalition was an 
extremist pro-Russian party, reportedly financed by 
Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov. They demanded the 
recognition of Russian as an official language and 
the allowance of dual citizenship – acts, which were 
against the laws of Ukraine (Hedenskog/Larsson 
2006: 38). Besides, in order to hamper the then 
on-going Ukraine-NATO approximation, large anti-
NATO rallies were organized in June. As a result, 
not only had the first-ever NATO Partnership for 
Peace military exercise had to be cancelled, but the 
demonstrations also contributed to the collapse of 
the governing coalition of the parties of the ‘Orange 
Revolution’ (Hedenskog/Larsson 2006: 39).
Until very recently, Russia has actively tried 
to incite ethnic tensions between the Tatar minority 
in the Crimea and ethnic Slavs. Experts claim that 
the reasons behind this were manifold. First, if 
Crimean Tatars were radicalized, they would lose 
support of their biggest donor, secular Turkey. As a 
side-effect, the regional influence of Turkey would 
also decrease. Second, sharpening ethnic tensions 
in the regions weakened the central government in 
Kyiv. Third, referring to the danger of growing Islamic 
radicalization, Russia could increase its forces 
stationed in Crimea in order to protect Russian 
citizens (Hedenskog/Larsson 2006: 40). However, 
with the new pro-Russian government coming to 
power in Ukraine, Russian-Ukrainian tensions over 
Crimea will probably decrease quickly.
As Russian security services have been 
usually involved in Crimean matters, a long debate in 
December 2009 was followed by the Ukrainian order 
to all FSB-agents attached to the Black Sea Fleet 
to leave Ukraine (Hedenskog 2010: 2). However, 
in May 2010 the new Azarov government has 
ordered Ukrainian security services to stop counter-
intelligence activities against Russian FSB agents 
operating in Ukraine, “as a gesture of goodwill and 
to demonstrate new policies,“ as the agreement puts 
it (RIA Novosti 2010).
Besides Crimea, there is another, though 
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small and marginal separatist movement in Ukraine, 
which also enjoys Russian support, namely the 
one of the ethnic Rusyns. The Rusyn minority lives 
mostly in the Zakarpatya region of Ukraine. Their 
ethnic movement strives mostly for being recognized 
as a separate nation among the ones living in 
Ukraine and for some cultural rights (Belitser 2000: 
15). However, some radical leaders, for example 
Dmytro Sidor, voiced the need for some form of 
territorial autonomy more than once. In reality, the 
situation has no escalation potential, as Rusyns are 
rather small in terms of population, are not organized 
and their ethnic identity is weak. However, financing 
and supporting such a movement has been used by 
Moscow to put additional pressure on Kyiv.
Trade Embargoes
Misusing trade relations connecting Russia with 
the post-Soviet countries is an obvious tool for the 
Kremlin to influence the politics of its neighbours. 
Compared to the well-known and well-documented 
energy cuts, trade embargoes have a huge 
advantage: they do not directly affect any other 
country except the targeted one, and especially not 
the rich, Western consumers of Russian energy 
and raw materials. Thus the chances of any outside 
pressure or intervention are much lower. Concerning 
the three countries of the common neighbourhood, 
Moscow has used trade embargoes relatively 
frequently. Both with Belarus and Moldova there 
have been regular clashes mostly connected to the 
import of agricultural products to Russia.12 
For example, in 2005 a serious Belarusian-
Russian conflict took place over the price of the sugar 
imported from Belarus. Belarusian producers took 
advantage of a valid intergovernmental agreement, 
through which they were able to export their products 
to Russia at a much lower price than the Russian 
producers could offer (Kommersant 2005). Though 
the debate was temporarily settled, the issue came 
up again in June 2007 (Democraticbelarus.eu 2007). 
The then introduced Russian import ban had a clear 
political motivation (along with its economic nature) 
which entailed the take over of several Belarusian 
milk plants. The technical reasoning of the ban were 
the irregularities experienced in the packaging of 
Belarusian milk products (Time 2009).
On the other hand, regardless of these 
temporary conflicts, trade relations between Russia 
12  Of course, the visibility of such trade conflicts 
largely depends on the overall international attention paid to 
the region. These issues started to appear in Western media 
only from early 2000s, parallel to the already mentioned 
growing importance of the Eastern neighbourhood.
and Belarus are uniquely close in the post-Soviet 
region, owing to the creation of the so-called Union 
State in the late 1990s. They are to become even 
closer with the establishment of the Customs Union 
of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan on 1st January 
2010. 
While one could consider the 2005 conflict 
over the Belarusian sugar import to be primarily of 
an economic nature, the ban put on the Moldovan 
wine import a year later was clearly different. 
Following the 2005 elections in Moldova, when 
President Vladimir Voronin pursued an increasingly 
pro-Western foreign policy (at least at that time), 
Russia banned the import of Moldovan (and actually 
Georgian) wines and other alcoholic products in 
March 2006. The official reasoning was the same 
in both cases. Gennadiy Onishchenko, Head of the 
Rospotrebnadzor (Russian Consumer Protection 
Agency) argued that heavy metals and pesticides 
were found in these wines. Thus their import would 
have endangered the health of Russian consumers. 
The step delivered a serious blow to Moldovan and 
Georgian agricultural business, as Russia had an 
export market share of 80-90%.
The political nature of this ban on Moldovan 
wine products became apparent, when an article was 
published in the Russian newspaper Kommersant 
with the telling title: “The Plan of Victory Over 
Moldova” (Kommersant 2005). Here the measures 
necessary for preventing “Moldova’s further lean on 
the West” were explicitly listed, among them the ban 
of Moldovan agricultural goods. As the article puts it, 
‘technical reasons’ could easily serve as a pretext – 
so they did, as demonstrated above.13
The history of Russian agricultural import 
bans on the neighbouring countries did not end in 
2007. Two years later, another conflict came up over 
the milk exported to Russia, this time with Belarus. In 
June 2009, Moscow banned the import of Belarusian 
milk products, once again voicing sanitary concerns 
(Time 2009). The background reasons might well be 
connected to the increasingly pro-Western oriented 
policy of Lukashenko, as well as to the ongoing 
debates of Belarus and Russia over the rising energy 
prices and the gradual take over of key Belarusian 
companies by Russian investors. The ban struck 
the Belarusian economy seriously. In 2008, Russia 
bought up almost 93% of Belarusian meat and dairy 
products (Time 2009).
However, compared to Moldova, Belarus has 
13  Concerning Georgia, the political nature of the 
ban could also hardly be questioned, taking into account 
the remarkably anti-Russian policy of Mikheil Saakashvili. 
Though an interesting side-story is that as a reward for his 
anti-Georgian action, Onishchenko was granted honorary 
citizenship by the ´president of South-Ossetia, Eduard Kokoyti 
in 2009 (RIA Novosti 2009).
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two relative advantages in resisting various negative 
Russian measures. The first one is its already 
discussed key transit position on the way of Russian 
oil and gas exports to Europe. Second, Belarus is 
able to block the gas electricity supply of Kaliningrad. 
Minsk has used this threat in January 2010 during 
the actual debate of Russia over the transit price of 
oil (Charter97.org 2010). The Belarusian capability 
to block the transit was also used as a threat during 
the recent gas dispute between Moscow and Minsk 
over their mutual gas price debts, which took place 
in late June 2010 (EurActiv.com 2010).
Immigration Restrictions
Guest workers coming from countries of the former 
Soviet Union are integral parts of the labour market 
of the Russian Federation. Their number is hard to 
estimate, due to the fact that many of them reside and 
work in Russia illegally or semi-legally. According to 
Federal Migration Service data, in 2005 there were 
about 15 million illegal guest workers in Russia, 
80% of whom were citizens of former Soviet Union 
states (Pravda.ru 2005). The main source countries 
have been the Central-Asian republics, Moldova, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
As guest workers mostly send the earned 
money back to their home countries, they make 
an important contribution to the economy of their 
home states. For example, in the case of Moldova, 
according to World Bank data, the remittances of 
guest workers provide approximately one-third of the 
country’s GDP (AllMoldova.com 2010). Therefore, 
if a host country – Russia in the current example 
– decides to restrict its immigration policy towards 
guest workers, it can easily damage the home 
countries of the guest workers economically. This is 
an integral part of Russia’s policy towards countries 
of the former Soviet Union.14 
From the three countries of the common 
neighbourhood, Belarus is the least affected. This 
is due to the framework of the Union State, which 
makes working in Russia a relatively simple process 
for a Belarusian citizen. However, in the case of 
Moldova the issue of guest workers is a serious one. 
Already during the parliamentary elections in 2005, 
Russia tried to pressurize President Voronin by 
introducing restrictions to Moldovan guest workers 
(Jamestown.org 2005), and the above mentioned 
“The Plan of Victory Over Moldova” has also named 
expelling guest workers as an important political tool 
against Moldova.
14  One may easily remember, when in 2006 Russia 
decided to deport Georgian guest workers en masse (BBC 
News 2006:10:5), and this was not the only case indeed.
However, the situation appears to be 
changing. Since 2007, new laws on labour migration 
were passed in order to legalize as many guest 
workers as possible and in order to increase budget 
incomes. Immigration helps Russia to fill gaps in the 
labour market, mostly in construction, retail trade, 
services, public transportation, etc. Approximately 
80% of all migrants are not required to have any 
qualification, thus they compete with unskilled 
Russians only. Moreover, their expected wages 
are much lower than those of Russian workers 
(Euromonitor 2007). Besides simply attracting labour 
force, there are also other motivations beyond the 
surface. According to Tatiana Golikova, Russian 
Minister for Health and Social Development, 
immigrants also play a role in sustaining the 
population growth (RIA Novosti 2009). In February 
2010, President Dmitry Medvedev has announced 
that immigration restrictions are to be further eased 
for highly qualified labour force, primarily for doctors, 
engineers, etc. (RIA Novosti 2010). This policy is 
called ‘optimization of immigration’. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that all these changes 
do not exclude any sudden backlash. The Kremlin 
may for instance decide to tighten the control of 
guest workers coming from one particular country or 
another. All in all, immigration restrictions as political 
tools are still not taken out of the Russian political 
inventory, since, as shown above, Russia is in the 
position to pull the strings in its own interest. 
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Conclusions 
The paper has shown that Russia perceives the 
common neighbourhood as a region that belongs 
to its own zone of influence. This attitude is based 
primarily on the historical legacy, and is further 
supported by the ongoing presence of Russian 
military forces in the analysed countries. The Russian 
forces stationed in these states are important not 
only from the geo-strategic point of view, but also for 
exercising direct political influence on them. Belarus 
is declared to be the most important security and 
defence ally of the Russian Federation, due to the 
Russian bases there and the ongoing integration of 
the military structures of both countries. The Russian 
Black Sea Fleet, whose presence was further 
extended by the Kharkiv Agreement until 2042, de 
facto excludes the NATO accession of Ukraine in 
the long run, even if the Alliance would be ready for 
the Eastern enlargement. In Moldova, the Russian 
peacekeeping forces stationed in Transnistria de 
facto guarantee the existence of the separatist 
‘Republic’ by their very presence. Moreover, as long 
as the territorial integrity of Moldova is not restored, 
neither a NATO, nor a EU-accession of the country 
is possible. Thus Chisinau will not be able to leave 
the Russian sphere of influence in this regard.
When the EU started its neighbourhood 
policy, Russia articulated its opposing position 
openly. Though Russia was still included in the Wider 
Europe initiative, Moscow decided to stay out of the 
ENP, claiming that Russia was an equal, strategic 
partner of the EU, and not simply a neighbour. The 
development of the ENP was perceived in Moscow 
as an EU effort to build its own zone of influence 
in a region, that belonged to the ‘near abroad’ 
of Russia. However, Russia gave only careful, 
moderate reactions to the final version of the EaP, 
launched in 2009. Russian officials did not even 
exclude the possibility of cooperating with the EU on 
certain issues, though no concrete proposals were 
made. Most probably, Moscow has been aware of 
the weaknesses of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, 
e.g. that neither the ENP, nor the EaP itself would be 
able to politically turn away countries of the common 
neighbourhood from Russia.
Russia already made two efforts in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s to ensure the loyalty of 
the neighbouring states by inducing constitutional 
change. The project of the Union State of Russia 
and Belarus seemingly stalled due to the limited 
cooperativeness of the Belarusian side, while the 
so-called Kozak-memorandum was openly refused 
by Moldova in 2003. Besides these efforts, Russia 
has been providing a number of integration options 
to the region, in order to ensure that the countries 
of the common neighbourhood would favour the 
Russian orientation to the Western option. Unlike 
the EU, the Russia-dominated organizations are 
not comprehensive (with the exception of the CIS, 
formed already in 1992), but rather focused ones. 
The CSTO has a security and defence cooperation 
as its main profile, while the Eurasian Economic 
Community and the newly established Customs 
Union are of economic purpose. As Wilson 
and Popescu argue, these Russian initiatives 
and political offers are easier to access and to 
understand by the neighbours than the sometimes 
complicated and blurry EU policies directed towards 
the neighbourhood (Popescu/Wilson 2009: 27). 
In case of non-compliance, Russia has 
a number of political tools to put pressure on the 
countries of the common neighbourhood. Besides 
the well-known politicization of the energy prices, 
supporting separatist movements, introducing trade 
embargoes and immigration restrictions are also 
integral parts of the Russian political inventory. 
However, though the choice of restrictive measures 
is relatively rich and hard power influence is ensured 
by the military presence, Russian experts admit that 
in terms of ‘soft power’ Russia is much weaker than 
the European Union. There would be much room 
for improvement in terms of using cultural influence, 
media power, scientific contacts and economic 
links. In Russian foreign policy concepts the idea of 
literally copying the ENP is emerging, e.g. to set up 
a ‘Russian Neighbourhood Policy’ towards countries 
of the post-Soviet region, in order to provide indeed 
attractive political and economic offers. 
 
Space for cooperation between the EU and Russia 
in the common neighbourhood?
If one puts aside the Russian efforts to provide 
alternatives to Western influence, theoretically 
there is a definite overlapping of EU and Russian 
interests at least in one fundamental question. This 
issue is the future EU-accession – and also the 
NATO accession – of the three countries studied. 
Interestingly enough, the EU and Russia seem to be 
of the same opinion, and pursue the same objectives, 
though with different background motivations. 
From the side of the EU, mentioning the accession 
perspective is constantly missing from the relevant 
documents, only approximation is on the agenda. 
Statements are firm: no further Eastern enlargement 
is possible in the near future. The Russian objectives 
are basically the same: preventing the three studied 
countries from joining the EU and NATO. This is why 
Russia strives for maintaining its troop presence, 
offers alternative integration formats, and reacts 
distanced and opposing, whenever it perceives the 
EU to `intervene in Russian spheres of influence’. 
However, though the theoretic overlapping of 
strategic interests is present hereby, hardly any 
cooperation could be built on that. The reason for 
this is the obvious and fundamental difference of the 
EU and Russian attitudes towards these countries: 
the antagonism of gradual approximation promoted 
by the EU versus the ‘status quo’ approach of 
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Russia. All in all, the lack of accession perspectives 
from the EU side, and the lack of attractive political 
alternatives presented from the Russian side seem 
to condemn these states to remain in an in-between 
position in the near future. 
The complete re-orientation towards Russia 
does not seem to be on the agenda in Minsk, Kyiv and 
Chisinau. During the parliamentary and presidential 
elections of the recent years, no serious candidates 
have campaigned with a clearly pro-Russian agenda 
in any of these states. This means a significant 
change compared to the early and mid-2000s. In the 
pre-Revolution Ukraine, Yanukovich campaigned 
with a strongly Russia-oriented and anti-Western 
programme. In Moldova, the ruling Communist party 
enjoyed Russian support during the 2005 elections, 
not to mention the fraudulent Belarusian referendum 
in 2004, which permitted Lukashenko to run for a 
third time for presidency. Nowadays, the situation 
has become different, as it was most recently visible 
in Ukraine. Viktor Yanukovich won the elections with 
a foreign policy programme, which aimed at having 
a pragmatic relationship both with the West and 
Russia. Even though Yanukovich is getting Ukraine 
increasingly closer to Russia with the Kharkhiv-
agreement (Hedenskog 2010: 2), this may only be a 
backlash effect that follows the mostly pro-Western 
course of the previous five years.
States of the common neighbourhood share 
one attitude in their relations towards the EU and 
Russia: namely that they are ready to utilize their 
in-between positions (Meister 2010). They show a 
tendency of playing the two actors off against each 
other: if one benefit is not granted by one, it is still 
possible to turn to the other. Both foreign and trade 
policies serve as good examples for this. By using 
a more positive wording, one could say that the era 
of ‘multi-vectorialism’ (a term originally connected 
to former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma) is 
returning in these countries. Besides, the countries 
of the common neighbourhood could also try to play 
off the EU against Russia in order to avoid necessary, 
but painful domestic political and economic reforms 
(Popescu/Wilson 2009: 25). 
Against this ‘bifocal’ attitude of the 
neighbours, there would actually be room for 
pragmatic, ideology-free coordination between 
the EU and Russia. This is especially true in fields 
which are of mutual importance for both Brussels 
and Moscow. The most important one is energy 
security, more concretely the security of energy 
transit through the common neighbourhood, as the 
uninterrupted flow of oil and gas is crucial both for 
the EU and Russia.
Similar areas of coordination could be 
various fields of security: nuclear safety and 
security, WMD-proliferation, fight against terrorism, 
fight against drug trade, etc. In these fields it is of 
mutual interest for the EU and Russia to encourage 
and facilitate the necessary reforms in the common 
neighbourhood. However, focal points in security 
cooperation should be selected with care. For 
example, putting the general term ‘fighting against 
organized crime’ on the agenda, one could not be 
sure that all important actors of the Russian elites 
would be ready for honest cooperation. However, 
the inflow of drugs from the region of Afghanistan is 
clearly a common threat, so is the spread of radical 
Islam terrorism. Obviously, not only coordination 
over the common neighbourhood, but also closer 
direct EU-Russia cooperation would definitely be 
of help. Concerning the Russian attitude to the 
EaP initiative, despite the efforts to counter various 
Western policy initiatives, Russia is far from being 
completely against cooperation with the EU in the 
common neighbourhood. Though the option of 
third party involvement did not meet enthusiasm in 
Moscow, there was no open refusal. Official reactions 
were moderate, not ruling out the possibility of future 
cooperation. However, experts assess the options 
of cooperation with the EU pessimistically. Since 
the Russian attitude is dominated by passivity, there 
are no proposals from the central government in 
Moscow. This means that the EU mostly needs to 
initiate any further cooperation. 
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